Opinion: The introduction of a fleet of missile-armed patrol boats to the Royal Australian Navy forms a lethal and agile component of the DSR’s strategy of deterrence, writes defence consultant and former naval officer Duncan MacRae.
Recently, I observed that the Australian National Audit Office’s (ANAO) latest audit report of the Hunter Class frigate program suggested a possible path of thought for the upcoming review of the Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) surface fleet; a reduction in the overall Hunter fleet (six instead of nine) and a reorientation to a larger fleet of smaller, highly armed crewed and uncrewed platforms. This latest achievement for the Indonesian fleet provides an example of the crewed option.
In the KCR-60M, Indonesia has a 60m vessel of approximately 500 tonnes, specifically designed to operate with high lethality throughout the largest archipelago in the world — which just so happens to form a critical component of our geographical defences against a northern threat. On size, the RAN’s direct equivalent is the retiring Armidale Class, and the Cape Class patrol boats. The comparison diverges rapidly as you start to consider matters of lethality; KCR-60M – 57mm main gun and 4 x surface-to-surface missiles, either RAN vessel – 25mm main gun (none on the Cape Class) and no missiles.
Of course, the Australian vessels have been designed squarely within a surveillance and border protection context and so their configuration reflects this. The point however is that (re-)introduction to the RAN fleet of vessels of this size, armed with highly lethal guided weapons, should be well within the scope of future force considerations. Both the operational and industrial sustainment infrastructure exists within Australia and a business case for the capability is clear.
Bang for buck, an armed patrol craft in the range considered so far provides a favourable option over all existing major surface combatants in the RAN fleet; $5 billion per Hunter gives eight anti-ship missiles, the equivalent patrol boat effect can be attained for approximately $200 million! Assuming a reduction in the Hunter order to six vessels, we are looking at the ability to procure somewhere in the order of 20 vessels. Tactically, that can look like 12-15 vessels darting around our “near North” providing a highly agile and lethal deterrent to anyone having designs on moving a surface fleet through that battlespace.
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If we go one step further and incorporate the latent capacity of the Arafura Class ships, we can reasonably assume up-gunned vessels of this size could provide even more firepower per ship; say eight missiles each and multiple air-delivered munitions from embarked UAS. With a fleet of 12 ordered, there is a reasonable force flow of another 6-8 ships enhancing the overall deterrence effort.
To arguments around survivability — patrol boats, and to a lesser degree OPVs, traditionally present a low-value target to both submarines and air-launched weapons alike — an adversary will need to apply a disproportionate amount of surveillance, targeting and firepower against them and would also need to completely restructure their own force design to do so (task groups of destroyers, aircraft carriers, and amphibious ships are uneconomic choices to employ against a dispersed patrol boat threat!). Self-defence systems can be scaled to appropriately reflect this reduced risk.
Critics are likely also to point to concerns over sustainment and persistence, driven largely by range and seakeeping. Such thinking is not without merit however in the case of range in particular, it reflects limits imposed by current operational models revolving heavily around large, well-established port facilities (mostly in Australia, but also Singapore).
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Proactive relationship-building with our neighbours, combined with innovative logistics solutions can allow smaller vessels to use the myriad of obscure archipelagic and island ports (both in the Indian and Pacific Oceans) to advantage. Indeed, this approach is likely to also be required by and support the Army’s new littoral manoeuvre and strike force structures.
Again, seakeeping concerns aren’t entirely unwarranted but the meteorological conditions in and around the archipelago that could perceivably denude the suggested patrol vessel capability aren’t significantly overcome by bigger ships or other ADF capabilities; tropical storms hamper guided weapon targeting regardless of launch platform, airborne carriers wouldn’t leave the deck and what hinders the blue force, generally hinders the red as well.
The introduction of a fleet of smaller, highly armed vessels to the RAN presents significant benefits, being highly complementary to larger surface units and the strategy of deterrence in line with the DSR. Successful adoption will require understanding, not avoiding risk, and embracing innovation in both the operational art and the capability lifecycle.
Duncan MacRae is a former officer in the Royal Australian Navy and is a consultant at Kiah Consulting.
